Although far from achieving resolution, scholarly debates over family decline have usefully highlighted the role of married women's declining fertility in explaining the growing proportion of children born into single-parent households (Bane and Jargowsky 1988; Luker 1996) , the relevance of long-term historical trends in family structure and divorce (Cherlin 1988; Furstenberg 1998; Greeley 1991; Spain and Bianchi 1996) , and the mediating role of public policies that provide for the welfare of women and children (Lichter 1997; Skolnick 1991; Strober and Dornbusch 1988) . However, questions relating to public attitudes toward family decline have been neglected. The focus of research on demographic or economic aspects of family change (e.g., structure, fertility, and marital dissolution) has not been complemented by investigations of attitudes toward family decline in the United States. This lack of research is significant on two counts.
First, while some proponents of the family decline thesis hypothesize a growing public concern with family decline (Popenoe 1993; Wilson 1993) , they provide no direct evidence. Second, it is likely that changes in family structure are not isomorphic with respect to (subjective) changes in attitudes and perceptions. If public attitudes toward the issue of family decline have consequences for the behavior of individuals or the organization of institutions independently of the influence of demographic and economic factors, their cultural or political meanings are worthy of detailed study.
In this study, I seek to extend research on family change to address questions about public attitudes. I emphasize that my goal is not to adjudicate ongoing debates over the effects of family change on the welfare of members or the stability of the institution. Instead, my focus is on the subjective di- mensions of family change. I ask the following questions: (1) Are there trends in the level of public concern with family decline? (2) What are the causal sources of concern with family decline? (3) Have changing levels of concern over family decline led to the emergence of a new political cleavage?
I apply a theory of religious influence to answer these questions. In addition to extending sociological research on family change in new and fruitful directions, my results bear on theory and research in political sociology and the sociology of religion. In the paper's first section, I develop a more precise conceptualization of the phenomenon of family decline, considering four elements discussed by proponents of the thesis. I then discuss a theoretical approach to religious influence that identifies causal processes which potentially explain the rise and partisan political relevance of public concern with family decline. After discussing data, measures, and models, I present the analyses. The broader significance of the results is discussed in greater detail in conclusion.
THEORIZING SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAMILY DECLINE CONCERN THE CONCEPT OF FAMILY DECLINE
What are the components of family decline in the United States? Proponents of the family decline thesis identify four social processes as indicators of the hypothesized decline of the family. DIVORCE. The growing rate of marital dissolution from the 1960s through the early 1980s is widely viewed as central to the hypothesized decline of the family. Divorce is said to have negative effects on the stability of the nuclear family, leading to social problems such as single-parent families and inadequate child socialization. Underlying these concerns is the preeminent value that most proponents of the family decline thesis assign to the ideas of lifelong marriage and continuity in families (e.g., Dobson and Bauer 1990; Popenoe 1994 ).
SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES. A second in-
dicator of family decline is the prevalence of single-parent families. Proponents of the family decline thesis view this family form as less viable than the traditional two-parent institution on economic and oftentimes normative grounds (e.g., Blankenhorn 1995; Murray 1993; Whitehead 1993). Policy proposals relating to changes in tax and divorce laws are often linked to the assumption that single-parent families are a major social problem to be addressed through government or legal reforms.
CHILDREN'S SOCIALIZATION. Many proponents of the family decline thesis argue that children's socialization is less adequate than in the past, leading to social problems such as juvenile crime and poor school performance (Whitehead 1993) . Inadequate child socialization is frequently viewed as a product of rising rates of divorce and a growing number of single-parent families (Gill 1997; Reed 1996) , suggesting causal connections between these elements of family decline.
CHILD POVERTY. Finally, proponents of the family decline thesis often view the economic welfare of children as linked to changes in family structure. Like children's socialization, child poverty is often hypothesized as both causing and being caused by other components of family decline such as single parenthood (Whitehead 1993; Wilson 1993 ). Some commentators identify child poverty as part of an hypothesized cycle of marital dissolution, inadequate child socialization, and single-parenthood (Murray 1993 A second way in which religion may influence concern with family decline is through variable rates of church attendance. All religious institutions communicate explicit normative recommendations about family behavior and organization (Stevens 2001; Thornton 1985 bership that accounts for concern with family decline.
A third way in which religion may lead to a concern with family decline is through exposure to denomination-specific influences. Thus the content of religious communication may vary across denominational families, leading to exposure to different types of religious influence. Qualitative differences between denominations in the content of communication are central to U.S. religious institutions (Regnerus, Sikkink, and Smith 1999; Woodberry and Smith 1998). Guided by recent findings regarding the social cohesiveness and moral conservatism of evangelical Protestants (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1990; Wilcox forthcoming), I evaluate the hypothesis that regular participation in evangelical churches leads to higher levels of concern with family decline. This scenario would be empirically manifested in a significant interaction of church attendance x evangelical Protestant, suggesting that evangelical churches facilitate higher levels of concern with family decline.
The theory of religious influence is consistent with findings that any of the preceding three causal mechanisms explain public concern with family decline. However, a finding that none of these mechanisms affects levels of public concern with family decline would make religious influence theory irrelevant. The results of the analyses provide evidence for the causal relevance of specific religious factors, thus advancing our understanding of religious influence with respect to issues and conflicts relating to family change.
POLITICAL BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS?
A general expectation of the theoretical work on religious influence is that by shaping politically relevant attitudes and identities, religion indirectly influences political behavior (Regnerus et al. 1999 I use the conceptualization discussed in the preceding section to identify responses that indicate a concern with family decline, assigning a score of "1" to respondents who mention one of the following problems: (1) family decline; (2) divorce rates or the instability of families; (3) single-parenthood or nonmarital births; (4) the inadequate socialization of children; and (5) references to child poverty that link it to one of the four preceding processes. All other respondents who were asked the NES question are assigned a score of "0" (see Table 1 ).
Because of its explicit reference to the "most important problem," the NES item enables measurement of the theoretical concept of public concern with family decline. requirement that individuals rank family decline as the most important problem discourages casual mentions of family decline, reducing the possibility of Type I errors. Type II errors (i.e., underestimating the true extent of concern with family decline) cannot be ruled out. However, given this study's focus on over-time processes, the latter scenario is of limited consequence as there is no reason to assume that such errors are correlated with time.
RELIGION VARIABLES
The first stage of the analyses (Table 1) Given the importance of economic factors to perceptions of social problems (Kiewiet 1983) , I include in the first (and also third) stage of the analyses controls for economic performance evaluations. Retrospective evaluations are measured using two dummy variables for responses comparing respondents' current economic and past economic situations; prospective evaluations are measured using two dummy variables for responses comparing current and future economic situations. All stages of the analyses include the following sociodemographic control variables: education (in years); household income (measured in 1992 dollars); age (in years); region (coded 1 for South); race (coded 1 for African American respondents); gender (coded 1 for female respondents); and class (dummy variables for professionals, managers, routine white-collar employees, self-employed nonprofessionals, skilled workers, unskilled/semiskilled workers, and non-full time labor force participants).
MEASURES OF VOTE CHOICE
In the second and third stages of the analysis (see Table 1 
STATISTICAL MODELS
The dependent variables analyzed in this study are dichotomous. I use logistic regression models to analyze the sources of concern with family decline and the effects of family decline concern on presidential vote choice, evaluating nested models that incorporate theoretically relevant hypotheses.
RESULTS

TRENDS IN PUBLIC CONCERN WITH FAMILY DECLINE
Have levels of public concern with family decline changed since the 1960s? Figure 1 displays the observed percentage of adult Americans who viewed family decline as the most important problem in the U.S. between 1972 and 1996. These data provide evidence for a growing trend in public concern with family decline since 1980. From 1976 through 1984, fewer than 2 percent of Americans considered family decline to be the most important problem. During the subsequent decade, public concern with family decline increased steadily and linearly, and by 1996, 1 out of 10 adult Americans ranked family decline as the most important social problem. Low levels of concern with family decline during the middle 1970s were preceded by slightly higher levels in the early 1970s. However, the 1972 level is roughly half that of the 1996 level, with the latter representing the highest observed level of concern with family decline. Taken as a whole, these results show that relying on presidential election year surveys does not yield a biased portrait of trends during the 1972 through 1996 period.9 9 A source of potential ambiguity stems from the alternative wording of the question used in What causal factors lead to high levels of concern with family decline? I address this question using the analyses presented in Table 2 . The entries in this table are coefficients and standard errors for two logistic regression models in which concern with the 1980 and 1982 surveys. Although the estimates of family decline concern for 1980 and 1982 are significantly lower than those in the adjacent years, they are consistent with the implied picture of a declining trend through the late 1970s followed by an increasing trend starting in the mid-1980s. family decline is predicted as a function of religion factors and other independent variables.
The effects of education, household income, region, class, gender, and race are not significant. Only one of the four coefficients for the effects of the economic controls is statistically significant. The effect of age is significant, but the impact is small-a 20-year difference in age changes the log-odds of a concern with family decline by only .2. While the sign of the coefficient for the effect of race is in keeping with past research documenting enduring differences in policy preferences among African Americans versus others (Tate 1993 ), the coefficient is not significant.
The key to understanding the social sources of these attitudes lies with the causal factors associated with the theory of religious influence. With regard to religious group memberships, evangelical Protestants have the highest level of concern with family decline. With regard to religious participation, the .45 coefficient for church attendance suggests that attendance is an important additional source of concern with family decline.10 Comparing across the full range of religious participation, moving from nonattendance to weekly attendance raises the odds of viewing family decline as the most important problem by a factor of 9.5 (corresponding to an approximately .28 increase in probability from an initial baseline of .05).
Model 2 explores these results in greater detail. Model 2 has a single, additional coefficient for the interaction of church attendance and membership in evangelical Protestant denominations, and it improves over Model l's fit according to both the -2 loglikelihood statistic and BIC index. This indicates that the impact of church attendance on concern with family decline is significantly different for evangelical Protestants compared with all other religious groups.
Model 2's coefficients reveal two important findings. First, the difference between the coefficients for evangelical Protestants and those of other religious groups shrinks considerably, suggesting that it is the differential and larger effects of church attendance among evangelicals that explain their higher levels of concern with family decline. Second, although participation in any religious institution has a significant effect in both models, this effect is smaller in Model 2 than in Model 1.
Because the pattern of interaction between religion and church attendance is central to understanding the sources of concern with 10 As a check on interval-level measurement of the church attendance covariate, I evaluated two alternative specifications to Model 1. The first of these, a logarithmetic transformation of attendance, consumes the same degrees of freedom as Model 1, but provides a far worse fit to data (-2 log-likelihood = 1899.15; BIC = -64,167). The second specification uses dummy variables to measure attendance as a nominal covariate, and it also yields a worse fit to data (-2 log-likelihood = 1877.20; BIC = -64,153). family decline, I also evaluate the fit of several supplementary models in Table 3 to test additional hypotheses. These analyses find no evidence for any additional interaction effects involving Protestant or Catholic denominational memberships and church attendance.ll The additional analyses also provide no evidence of change in the effects of attendance over time (the fit of Model 1 is superior to the fits of Models 7 through 10). The superiority of the preferred model from Table 2 (Model 1 in Table 3 ) implies that interaction effects involving religion and church attendance are limited to the twoway interaction of church attendance x evangelical Protestants.
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE EFFECTS OF RELIGION FACTORS
Figure 2 summarizes the effects of religion and church attendance on concern with family decline. Given the interaction between evangelical Protestants and church attendance, it is appropriate to simultaneously consider the effects of all religion factors. Figure 2 presents the predicted probability of ranking family decline as the most important problem by varying religious group membership and church attendance rate, holding all other independent variables at fixed levels.12
In Figure 2 , the generally small curvature of the lines for mainline and black Protestants, Catholics, Jewish respondents, and those with no religion13 indicate that church l The small reduction in the -2 log-likelihood statistic produced by allowing the effects of church attendance to differ across all religious groups (see Model 2) is not close to achieving significance using either the chi-square test or BIC. Comparison of Model 1 with Models 3 and 4 provides no evidence for interactions involving race or gender and religion; comparison of Model 1 with Models 5 and 6 provides no evidence for interactions involving race or gender and church attendance. 12 The fixed values for these variables are: nonblack males living outside the South in 1984 who are not working full-time, who are at the sample means of age, education, and household income, and who endorse the "same" response to the economic evaluation items.
13 While the fact that church attendance has any impact on respondents in the "no religion" attendance has a small impact on level of concern with family decline. By contrast, church attendance has a slightly larger impact on family decline concern among respondents in other religions.'4 The largest effects of church attendance are found, however, among evangelical Protestants, with regular church attenders being over 24 times more likely than nonattenders to consider family decline as the most important problem. The magnitudes of the church attendance effect among evangelical Protestants can be seen in the last panel's estimates; these estimates reveal that compared with category may appear initially to represent a paradox, it is readily explained by the heterogeneity of individuals within this category (Glenn 1987b) , not all of whom are genuine atheists. 14 Model 2's coefficients (see Table 2 ) assume that the impact of church attendance on the logodds of concern with family decline is identical across all religious groups (with the single exception of evangelical Protestants). Note that because the level of these attitudes is higher among respondents in the "other religion" category compared with the remaining groups, the predicted effect of church attendance on the probability of family decline concern among other religions is higher. This divergence in logit versus probability metrics reflects the insensitivity of the logit estimates to the distribution of the dependent variable. the 24-fold effect for evangelicals, the corresponding effect of church attendance among all other respondents (i.e., all nonevangelicals) is approximately 5.
Although these results suggest that church attendance (and thus exposure to churchbased communication and influence) is the underlying factor explaining evangelical Protestants' comparatively high levels of concern with family decline, an alternative hypothesis is that regular church attendance is instead the result of members' preexisting attitudes. Two considerations cast doubt on this alternative hypothesis. First, research on religious participation finds that church attendance is shaped strongly by socialization and life course transitions (Sherkat 1998; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995), factors not likely to be influenced by a concern with family decline. Second, if family decline concern influenced church attendance, the over-time increase in concern would by itself have caused a subsequent rise in church attendance rates. Although contemporary research on church attendance is marked by a significant debate over whether U.S. church attendance remains high and generally stable (Hout and Greeley 1987; 
1998; Presser and Stinson 1998; see Chaves and Gorski 2001 for review of religious participation in comparative-historical perspective)
, there is general agreement that church attendance rates did not rise during the past two decades. It is, in principle, possible that self-selection is operating while a third factor that is uncorrelated with level of concern with family decline simultaneously acts so as to depress church attendance. Although this scenario cannot be ruled out, it is considerably more complicated than the inference that church attendance influences concern with family decline. The absence of any evidence for the more complicated scenario suggests that the simpler proposition is preferable.
Given that public concern with family decline is concentrated among evangelical Protestants who attend church regularly, we can reestimate the increase in concerns over family decline from 1980 to 1996 to better observe the importance of evangelical attitudes to this trend: Whereas the overall increase in level of family decline concern is 9 percent, the corresponding increase without evangelicals' attitudes shrinks to 5 percent. Accordingly, without the disproportionate concentration and growth of concern with family decline among evangelical Protestants, the overall increase in such attitudes would have been considerably smaller.
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW POLITICAL CLEAVAGE
Does concern with family decline affect the behavior of voters, perhaps leading to the emergence of a new political cleavage? I answer this question using the results of the second stage of the analysis. In Table 4 , I evaluate the fit of a series of models that predict the log-odds of Democratic versus Republican Party vote choice in the seven presidential elections between 1972 and 1996.
The comparison between the first two models easily favors Model 2, providing evidence that concern with family decline does affect presidential vote choice. Model 3 is preferred over Model 2, establishing that the political effects of concern with family decline have changed over time, following a linear pattern. Allowing the effects of family decline concern to differ in each election (Model 4) does not improve over Model 3, and the small difference in -2 log-likelihood between Models 3 and 4 (3.24; 5 d.f.) implies that all the interaction between family decline concern and year is captured by Model 3. In the final model (Model 5), I add a series of controls to estimate the direct effects of concern with family decline on vote choice.
The coefficients from Models 2, 3, and 5 provide more detailed information about the effect of public concern with family decline on vote choice. Given that Model 3 improves over Model 2's fit, Model 3's coefficients reveal the ways in which Model 2 misspecifies the political effects of concern with family decline: Instead of a large, stable effect (as in Model 2), Model 3's coefficients suggest that the effects of concern with family decline increased steadily over time. More specifically, the predicted effect of concern with family decline is modest in the 1970s, but by 1984 the effect is substantial (-1.41), and by 1996, the corresponding effect is predictably larger (-2.31). All else being equal, concern with family decline increasingly disposes voters to favor Republican over Democratic presidential candidates. The over-time growth in the effect on vote choice of a concern with family decline also suggests that high levels of such concerns prior to the 1970s were of limited political consequence (given the much smaller coefficient for family decline concern early in the 1972 to 1996 series).
Comparing the coefficients for Models 3 versus Model 5 reveals whether the effect of concern with family decline on vote choice is independent of the corresponding political effects of the sociodemographic covariates. The coefficient for the family decline concern x year effect is virtually unchanged across Models 3 versus 5, suggesting the independence of the political effects of family decline concern.15 The magnitude of the effects of concern with family decline on vote choice over a relatively lengthy period of time suggests the emergence of a growing cleavage in presidential elections during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Using Model 5's coefficients (and the relevant sample means), the predicted difference in vote choice for respondents scoring 0 versus 1 on the family decline item is .30 in 1988, .41 in 1992, and .48 in 1996. These predicted differences are 15 I also compared Model 5 with a competing model that allows the religion and family decline concern variables to interact with one another.
The resulting lack of improvement in fit (7.25; 6 d.f.) implies that the effect of concern with family decline on vote choice is the same for the seven religious groups in the analysis (see Appendix A for all coefficients and standard errors for Model 5 in Table 4 ). large, especially given that they reflect the influence of a single variable. For instance, the preceding estimates indicate that viewing family decline as the most important problem in the 1996 election is predicted as substantially lowering (by .48) the probability of a typical voter supporting the Democratic candidate (Bill Clinton).
To provide additional evidence that the effect of family decline concern on vote choice is independent of other, better-known sources of the presidential vote, Table 5 presents the third stage of the analysis, which takes advantage of more extensive data available in the 1992 and 1996 NES surveys. Model 1 of Table 5 estimates the total effect of concern with family decline on presidential vote choice, and Model 2 estimates the direct effect by controlling for attitudes toward abortion, gender, the welfare state, economic evaluations (and sociodemographic factors).
The key comparison in Table 5 is between the coefficient for concern with family decline in Model 1 versus Model 2. The total effect of a concern with family decline is larger than the direct effect, but the coefficient in Model 2 retains over 73 percent of its original magnitude. This result provides evidence that the association between concern with family decline and presidential vote choice represents a new source of voter alignments in the United States (rather than the political effect of a preexisting cleavage).
It should be emphasized that because the actual percentage of voters exhibiting high levels of concern with family decline has been relatively modest (10 percent at its highest level in 1996), the effects of this cleavage on the outcome of elections have also been modest. For instance, the 6-percent increase in concern with family decline from 1988 to 1996 is predicted as lowering the Democratic share of the major party vote in 1996 by approximately 3 percent, resulting in a slightly lower margin of victory for Democratic incumbent Bill Clinton without necessarily changing the outcome of that election. For the family decline cleavage to have a larger effect on the outcome of elections, either the level of family decline concern or its association with vote choice would have to increase. In the absence of these developments, the family decline cleavage is most notable as a new dimension of partisan This trend is consistent with the hypothesis discussed above, and it can be further appreciated when juxtaposed with results from my analyses of its consequences for political behavior. Indeed, in the absence of such evidence, skeptical commentators might reasonably call into question the sociological significance of a phenomenon that has no effect on the actual behavior of individuals. My analyses address this question by providing evidence that voters' level of concern with family decline has had a growing impact on their voting behavior in presidential elections, with concern with family decline by itself disposing voters to support Republican candidates.
The growing association between level of family decline concern and presidential vote choice suggests the emergence of a new cleavage in U.S. politics. We can appreciate the justification for this inference by considering the implications of results that instead showed a pattern of short-term political-behavioral effects (or a pattern in which the effects of family decline concern varied widely in magnitude over time). Results of this sort would suggest the emergence of a policy issue whose partisan relevance was specific to one or more particular campaigns or elections, but not the emergence of a new political cleavage. However, because it is characterized by a growing trend in partisan impact, and because it is shaped by the divergent experiences of groups with long-standing differences in identity and ideological orientation, the issue of family decline appears to qualify as a novel cleavage.
POLITICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON ELECTORAL POLITICS
The results of this study advance politicalsociological research on electoral politics in two additional ways. First, evidence for the emergence of a new and relatively enduring source of U.S. voter alignments extends contemporary research and scholarly debates over partisan change in developed democracies ( The current study's results contribute to the reconsideration of political trends among evangelicals by providing evidence that growing levels of concern with family decline between 1980 and 1996 were disproportionately concentrated among evangelical Protestants. I find evidence that high levels of concern with family decline are facilitated by exposure to church-based religious communication. The effect of regular church attendance is larger for members of evangelical Protestant churches, attesting to differences in the effects of religious communication across denominations, especially between evangelical versus nonevangelical churches. These results imply that claims about family decline found their most receptive audience among active members of evangelical Protestant denominations.16 16 The possibility that concern with family decline influences church attendance is less likely than the reverse, given that it implies that growth in family decline concern would by itself have raised church attendance rates-and research has My results bear further on questions concerning the effects of religious movements. During the 1990s, the Christian Coalition offered a problem-oriented characterization of family decline, using voter guides that were widely distributed in churches and through public addresses often conducted by (then) executive director, Ralph Reed (Reed 1994 (Reed , 1996 . When viewed through the lens of the theory of religious influence applied here, the preceding results raise fruitful questions about the influence of Christian Right organizations on clergy and members of evangelical Protestant churches. In general, my findings are consistent with this scenario and also with recent research on the political influence of the Christian Right on evangelical voters in the 1990s (Regnerus et al. 1999) . Although it seems likely that wellpositioned evangelical leaders communicated messages resulting in higher levels of concern with family decline among their congregations, the possibility that communicative processes among church attenders (or some combination of these two factors) were also important cannot be conclusively ruled out. Using the results of the current study as a baseline, further research may be able to shed additional light on this line of interpretation.
The causal importance of religion factors also suggests some limits on the growth of public concern with family decline. First, the changing social and economic context of the past decade-stabilization in divorce rates and nonmarital births coupled with rising household income and low unemploymentmay direct some religious leaders' attention to other issues while lowering the receptivity of individuals to family decline claims that emphasize the negative economic consequences of divorce or single-parenthood. A second factor relates to denominational differences and the concentration of concerns with family decline among evangelifound no evidence of such trends (Hadaway et al. 1993 (Hadaway et al. , 1998 ; Presser and Stinson 1998; Woodberry 1998)-or the operation of a considerably more complicated causal scenario for which there is no evidence. Evidence that church attendance is shaped by socialization and lifecourse transitions (Sherkat 1998 ) is also relevant, given that it is improbable that concern with family decline could influence the latter factors.
cal Protestants. Contemporary research on perceptions of religious groups finds that individuals who are not members of evangelical Protestant denominations have generally negative attitudes toward the views they attribute to evangelicals (C. Smith 1998). In the absence of social networks that would extend their communicative influence across denominational boundaries, it seems likely that claims associated with evangelical Protestant clergy or laity will have a more limited impact on members of other religious traditions. The disproportionate concentration of concern with family decline among the most observant evangelicals reveals not only the most receptive constituency for this phenomenon but also suggests some possible limits on its further growth. 
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